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Executive Summary
Competition and prospective payment systems have been widely used to at-
tempt to control health care costs. Although much of the increase in medical
costs over the past half-century has been concentrated among a few high-cost
users of health care, prospective payment systems mayprovide incentives to
reduce expenditures selectively on high-cost users relative to low-cost users,
and this pressure may be increased by competition. We use data on hospital
charges and cost-to-charge ratios from California in 1983 and 1993 to examine
the effects of competition on costs for high- and low-cost admissions before
and after the establishment of the Medicare Prospective Payment System
(PPS). Comparing persons above and below age 65 before and after the estab-
lishment of PPS, we find that competition is associated with increased costs be-
fore PPS in both age groups, but decreased costs afterwards, especially among
those above age 65 with the highest costs. We conclude that the combination of
competition and prospective payment systems may result in incentives to re-
duce spending selectively among the most expensive patients. This conclusion
raises important issues relevant to the use of competition and prospective pay-
ment to control costs. It also implies that, at minimum, there is a need to care-
fully monitor outcomes for the sickest patients under prospective payment
systems in competitive environments.
I.Introduction
After a half-century of extraordinary growth in health care expendi-
tures in the United States, there is now evidence that health care spend-
ing growth is slowing. Why this is occurring and how long it may last
is not known, but a substantial body of literature suggests that two key
elements of the efforts to contain costs may have played a role: the use
of prospective payment systems (Russell and Manning 1989) and the
encouragement of competition among providers (Melnick and Zwan-
ziger 1988). Indeed, the combination of these two approaches seems to54 Meltzer and Chung
be particularly important because competition in the absence of pro-
spective payment systems has been suggested to increase costs (Robin-
son and Luft 1985), and prospective payment in the absence of
competition provides no financial incentive to provide quality care.
While most theoretical discussions of the effects of prospective pay-
ment hinge on the incentives to provide lower levels of care under
fixed reimbursement and do not discuss the differential incentives to
provide care to different types of patients,1 a few theoretical examina-
tions of prospective payment have also incorporated the differential in-
centives for spending on profitable and unprofitable patients (for
example, Allen and Gertler 1991, Ellis 1998). Meanwhile, several em-
pirical studies have examined the differential effects of prospective
payment systems on low- and high-cost patients. For example, Ellis
and McGuire (1996) show how prospective payment for mental health
services under Medicaid in New Hampshire resulted in reduced ex-
penditures selectively among the sickest patients. In the context of the
Medicare PPS, Newhouse (1989) finds that, while patients in unprofit-
able diagnosis related groups (DRGs) were not more likely than other
patients to be transferred under PPS, they are more likely to be found
in "hospitals of last resort," suggesting that there is selection according
to profitability. Similarly, Meltzer and Chung (2000) show that hospital
spending for the elderly in California under Medicare PPS was selec-
tively reduced among the most expensive patients. Indeed, these re-
ductions occurred despite an overall pattern among the young and
elderly prior to the implementation of Medicare PPS for cost growth to
be greatest among the most expensive patients, as reflected in the in-
creasing concentration of health care expenditures over this century
(Cutler and Meara 1998). Meltzer and Chung show that this same pat-
tern of selective cost reduction for the most expensive patients is pres-
ent within the twelve largest DRGs, the categories by which Medicare
reimburses hospitals under PPS.
The possibility that prospective payment systems may lead to a re-
distribution of resources from sick and costly persons within a pay-
ment category to healthier and more profitable ones cuts, in many
ways, against a fundamental tenet behind prospective payment
systems: namely, the subsidization of unprofitable patients by the
profitable. Nevertheless, competitive pressures could lead to such an
outcome as hospitals that attempt to support the care of unprofitable
patients with revenue from profitable ones find the profitable patients
wooed away by other hospitals that have chosen to invest resources inEffects of Competition Under Prospective Payment on Hospital Costs 55
amenities that may appeal to patients and their doctors, but that are not
necessarily directly associated with producing better outcomes for the
most severely ifi.
In this paper, we use California data on patient charges and hospital
cost-to-charge ratios from 1983 and 1993 to explore the effects of com-
petition under prospective payment on hospital costs for low- and
high-cost admissions within the twelve largest DRGs.2 Since Medicare
PPS was implemented nationwide by states nearly simultaneously, we
have to identify the effects of PPS on hospital costs mainly through
temporal cross-sectional analyses rather than cross-state analyses. In an
attempt to separate the effects of PPS from temporal changes in market
competition, however, we contrast the effects of competition on costs
for admissions of persons older than 65 versus costs for admissions
of persons under 65. Complicating this analysis is the consideration of
contemporaneous changes in the organization and financing of Medi-
Cal, California's Medicaid agency. In particular, the development of a
selective provider contracting program and per-diem reimbursement
system by Medi-Cal, in addition to the increasing use of managed care
arrangements, all contributed to suppressing hospital growth among
the young in California over the 1983-1993 period.
Although we cannot prove that the patterns we observe are due to
Medicare PPS, we find clear evidence that increased competition is as-
sociated with increased costs among the elderly before the implemen-
tation of PPS, but decreased costs afterward, with the reductions in
costs clearly much greater among high-cost admissions than among
low-cost admissions. This is consistent with the idea that the incentives
created by Medicare PPS may have selectively reduced expenditures
on the high-cost elderly.
We begin in Section II with a short overview of the most important
cost-containment efforts prevailing in California during this period: the
Medicare Prospective Payment System, the California Medi-Cal selec-
tive provider contracting program, and the expansion of managed care.
The description of PPS provides the institutional context for the effects
of PPS we aim to investigate, while the discussion of the changes in re-
imbursement strategies among the young provides some insight into
the use of the temporal changes in the effects of competition on costs
for the young as a comparison. In Section III, we develop the theoreti-
cal motivation for our analyses using a model of provider response
to fixed-rate, prospective reimbursement, in which quality can be var-
ied for patients who differ in their underlying severity of illness and,56 Meltzer and Chung
hence, profitability In Section IV. we describe our data, and in Sec-
tion V. we present the results of our analyses of the effects of competi-
tion on cost. Section VI concludes and examines the implications of our
work for the design of reimbursement strategies, for quality assess-
ment, and for outcomes research.
II.Background on Cost-Containment in California, 1983-1993
Between 1983 and 1993, diverse cost-containment strategies were
undertaken in California. They led to a widespread transition to pro-
spective payment systems as well as intensified hospital market com-
petition.3 Here, we discuss briefly major cost-containment strategies
that were implemented over this period: the Medicare Prospective Pay-
ment System; selective provider contracting among California's Medic-
aid program, Medi-Cal, and health care providers; and the expansion
of managed care arrangements.
Medicare PPS
Prospective payment systems certainly existed prior to the establish-
ment of the Medicare PPS in 1983. Nevertheless, the scale and influence
of Medicare made the shift from retrospective reimbursement on the
basis of reasonable costs to PPS a change of fundamental importance
for hospitals. With the establishment of PPS, reimbursement for nearly
all hospitalizations under Medicare were made on the basis of prospec-
tively fixed rates according to diagnosis-related groups. Each hospital-
ization is assigned a DRG based on principal diagnosis or the
performance of a very limited number of particularly costly procedures
(for example, coronary artery bypass graft surgery). Each DRG is as-
signed a fixed weight that reflects its relative cost of treatment with re-
spect to a base rate. Because hospitals are paid a fixed amount per DRG
based on the DRG weight, the classification system and aimed to create
groups of patients as homogeneous as possible with respect to resource
consumption. DRGs were also stratified with respect to age and the
presence of complications.
After a phase-in period of four years, during which hospital reim-
bursement reflected a mix of national, regional, and facility-specific
rates (Smith and Fottler 1985), hospitals were reimbursed for each case
according the national average cost of treating a base case (with adjust-
ments to reflect location and local wages), multiplied by the DRGEffects of Competition Under Prospective Payment on Hospital Costs 57
weight (Davis et al. 1990). Thus, reimbursement under PPS was fully
prospective from the onset, but the persistence of differences in pay-
ment rates based on historical local costs meant that the competitive as-
pects of PPS increased progressively over its phase-in.
Medi-Cal Selective Contracting
The same year that Medicare PPS was implemented, California enacted
legislation authorizing the state Medicaid program, Medi-Cal, to nego-
tiate contracts with health service providers for the care of Medi-Cal
beneficiaries. This was done with the intent to promote price competi-
tion in the Medicaid market. Under this legislation, eligible, short-term,
acute-care general hospitals were offered the opportunity to negotiate
service provision contracts with Medi-Cal on the basis of fixed
per-diem rates (Johns 1985). Failure to secure a contract meant that hos-
pitals would not be reimbursed for care given to Medi-Cal patients ex-
cept in cases of emergency (Langa 1992). Although the per-diem
reimbursement established under this legislation did not result in a
fully prospective payment system for Medi-Cal patients, the resulting
declines in Medi-Cal reimbursement also intensified the competitive
pressure on California hospitals during this period.
Expansion of Managed Care
During the 1980s, managed care spread rapidly throughout the United
States, but particularly in California. By 1988, California ranked first in
the nation in terms of its HMO enrollment rate, with roughly 28.5 per-
cent of the state population (7.68 million individuals) belonging to an
HMO (Johns 1989). This was more than double the national rate in
1987, when only 12.1 percent of the U.S. population was enrolled in an
HMO (Davis et al. 1990), and even well above the national rate of 19.7
percent in 1994 (Institute of Medicine 1997). Likewise, the number of
Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs) in California grew 94 percent,
from 34 PPOs in 1984 to 72 in 1988 (Johns 1989).
Some managed care payers adopted prospective payment systems
for hospital care similar to Medicare PPS. However, the majority
adopted other approaches to cost control, such as selective contracting,
per diem reimbursement, and utilization review. These mechanisms
did not necessarily provide any particular incentive to decrease expen-
ditures for high-cost users relative to low-cost users (Gold et al. 1995).58 Meltzer and Chung
Nevertheless, many aspects of managed care served to further inten-
sify competition in California during these years.
Indeed, the empirical evidence suggests that Medicare PPS,
Medi-Cal selective contracting, and managed care arrangements all
contributed to curbing cost growth. From 1967 to 1984, Medicare hospi-
tal care expenditures had been growing at an average annual rate of
16.5 percent; in the seven years immediately following PPS, growth fell
to 7.3 percent (Davis and Burner 1995). Based on projections of
Medicare expenditures, Russell and Manning (1989) estimated savings
of $12 to $18 billion for 1990 under PPS. Medi-Cal selective contracting
in California also appears to have been largely successful in raising the
level of competition in hospital markets while simultaneously sup-
pressing cost growth (Johns 1989, Robinson and Phibbs 1989, Melmck
et al. 1992). The growth of managed care organizations also contributed
to lower cost growth, both by delivering health care at lower costs due
to lower service intensity (Manning et al. 1984) and by increasing com-
petition in hospital markets (Melnick and Zwanziger 1995).
Thus, between 1983 and 1993, hospitals in California became increas-
ingly subject to prospective payment systems as a result of Medicare
PPS, and increased competition due to the effects of Medi-Cal selective
contracting and the growth of managed care. In this context, economic
theories of provider behavior under prospective reimbursement sug-
gest incentives to decrease expenditures on high-cost patients while in-
creasing expenditures on low-cost patients, as we explore below.
III.Economic Theories of Provider Behavior Under Fixed-Rate
Prospective Payment Systems
Many cost-containment strategies rely on supply-side cost sharing to
achieve cost-containment objectives. Whereas retrospective reimburse-
ment systems largely insulate providers from increases in costs, pro-
viders under prospective payment systems are paid a fixed rate per
unit of output that is defined in advance.
If the patient population is taken as given, such payment schemes
that hold providers financially responsible for the marginal costs of
treatment can create incentives to reduce provision of unnecessary ser-
vices to patients. This is reflected by the common view of managed care
as reducing services. What is less appreciated, however, is that when
providers have to compete for patients, prospective payment systems
also create a new distinction among patients, namely, a distinction be-
tween profitable and unprofitable patients, depending on their ex-Effects of Competition Under Prospective Payment on Hospital Costs 59
pected costs relative to the level of prospective reimbursement (New-
house 1989). Thus, when profit-maximizing hospitals under fixed-rate
prospective reimbursement face a patient population of variable illness
within a reimbursement category (such as a DRG), they may have in-
centives to provide excessive levels of care for the less ill and/or to
choose and advertise quality of care or amenities that differentially at-
tract profitable patients while avoiding unprofitable ones (Hornbrook
and Rafferty 1982, Ellis and McGuire 1986, Dranove 1987, Luft and
Miller 1988, Newhouse 1989, Hodgkin and McGuire 1994, Ellis 1998).
When intensified competition decreases overall profit levels and in-
creases the price responsiveness of patient volume, such strategies may
become matters of institutional survival. Thus, as Ellis (1998) has
shown, incentives to engage in patient selection and discrimination in
quality provision are exacerbated under increased competition, a con-
dition that has been realized in many U.S. hospital markets in recent
years due to greater market penetration by managed care organiza-
tions (Ellis 1998, Dranove and White 1994).
The empirical implications of these theories is that, where providers
are subject to fixed-rate prospective payment systems, declines inhos-
pital cost growth will be concentrated at the top of the spending distri-
bution. In other words, high-cost (unprofitable patients) will experi-
ence greater reductions in resource consumption relative to low-cost
(profitable) patients. Furthermore, these effects will be magnified un-
der competition.
To illustrate this, we develop the following model of choice of qual-
ity of care for patients with differing severity of illness (s) given a pro-
spective payment rate (F). Specifically, we model the choice of quality
of care for patient of severity s at costc(qs). Tocapture the variation in
costs of patients who differ in severity of illness, we allow the cost of
providing basic care to depend also on severity [c(s)]. Thus, the total
cost of caring for a patient of a given severity is c(s) + c(q). The first
component, c(s), is nondiscretionary, whereas the second component,
c(qs), issubject to choice depending on the desire of a hospital to pro-
vide additional quality. In other words, we model the profit from car-
ing for a patient of a given severity level (s) under prospective payment
as:
ii = P - c(s) - c(q6) (3.1)
We assume that c, > 0, c5,> 0 and that, with respect to the cost of de-
livering discretionary quality, c(0) = 0, cq > 0, and cqq> 0. To go from60 MeltzerandChung
this patient-level profit to the profit earned from caring for the class of
patient of severitys,we allow the demand for care by patients of sever-
ityswhen quality is q, to beD(s,q) =D(q5), Dq> 0, Dqq <0. The hospi-
tal chooses q to maximize profit:
Max'r=D(q)[P -c(s) - c(qà] (3.2)
Taking the derivative of equation (3.2) with respect to q. yields the
first-order optimality condition that hospitals set the marginal revenue
from additional quality equal to the marginal cost of providing that
quality:
=D'(q5)[P -c(s) -c(q5)1 - D(q)c'(q)=0 (3.3)
Equation (3.3) implies:
EPc(s)c(q)] (1Yc'(q )q. Ec,q
c(q5) ID'(q)qjc(q)J D(q)
Totally differentiating and checking second-order conditions demon-
strates:
(3.4)
dqD"(q5)(Pc(s)--c(q )]-2D'(q) c'(q5 )D(q5) c"(q)
<0 (3.5) D'(q)c'(s)
as long as P - c(s)0, andqs =0 otherwise. Thus, discretionary quality
falls with severity for all profitable patients and is set to zero for all
unprofitable patients.
Comparison to Retrospective Reimbursement
Since one of the empirical comparisons we will make is between pro-
spective reimbursement and retrospective reimbursement, it is useful
to contrast this result with the result that would transpire under a ret-
rospective reimbursement system, according to our model. In particu-
lar, instead of a fixed price P that is independent of severity and quality,
a retrospective reimbursement system may in general depend on both,
for example, P(s, q5). Under some circumstances, this makes the com-
parison between prospective and retrospective reimbursement easy; in
others, it is more difficult. To illustrate this, assume P(s,q5)takes the
general form P(s, q)=P0+P5c(s) + Pqc(qs), where Po. P, and Pq are theEffects of Competition Under Prospective Payment on Hospital Costs 61
rates at which hospitals are reimbursed for, respectively, thebasic ad-
mission (as in prospective payment), expenditures on severity-related
costs, and expenditures on discretionary dimensions of quality (for ex-
ample, amenities). In general, the latter two categories may be hard to
distinguish in practice, but the distinction is worth making to reflect
the idea that there may be some expenditures that may not be covered
fully under a retrospective reimbursement system but are nevertheless
desired by hospitals to attract patients.6 For our purposes, the most
straightforward case is when reimbursement provides a fixed amount
of profit per admission by providing a lump-sum profit (K) per admis-
sion and exactly reimburses severity-related costs while not covering




and quality is independent of s. In this case, the shift to prospective
payment would be expected to decrease spending for more expensive
patients relative to less expensive ones.
Perhaps even more relevant is the case in which retrospective reim-
bursement provides no fixed profit per admission but instead offers a
markup over costs for severity-related costs, for example, Po = 0, Ps>
1, and Pq = 0. Here equation (3.4) becomes
[P5c(s)c(s)c(q5)Cc,q dq5 - and>0
c(q5) EDq ds
Thus, with P5> 1, hospitals make more profit on more expensive pa-
tients and therefore will spend more on quality for the more expensive
patients. Again, the switch to prospective payment will lead to a reduc-
tion in spending among the sicker patients.
Finally, it is also worth considering a system in which no fixed profit
per admission is given but in which all costsrelated to both severity
and quality are reimbursed retrospectively with a markup. Some might
consider this most like the retrospective reimbursement system as it
was applied prior to prospective payment. In this case, Po =0, and P5 =
Pq> 1. Equation (3.4) now becomes:
[PsC(S)+Pq c(q5 )c(s)(q5)][(P5 1)(c(s)+c(q5 ))1
c(q5) - c(q5) EDq
dq
and again62 Meltzer and Chung
This seems to suggest that quality would rise with severity, but this
conclusion would be misleading because full retrospective reimburse-
ments for amenities provide no incentives for hospitals to limit expendi-
tures on amenities. Hence, the second-order conditions actually imply
that the optimal quality hospitals should provide is infinite quality for
all patients. Thus, there must be some other constraint on the reim-
bursement of discretionary care, which seems most likely to be a com-
bination of the possibility of doing harm to the patient (and associated
risk of liability) and whatever limits are placed by the payer. Which-
ever the case, it is not possible to predict how prospective payment wifi
affect discretionary expenditures on low- and high-cost patients.
To summarize, except in the case where discretionary expenditures
are not limited by economic incentives, there appears to be a fairly
broad set of assumptions under which prospective payment would be
expected to reduce expenditures selectively for the most expensive pa-
tients relative to retrospective reimbursement.
Effects of Competition
Equation (3.4) implies that the ratio of profit to cost for quality falls
with increasing elasticity of demand with respect to quality so that, ac-
cordingly, quality rises with increasing elasticity of demand with re-
spect to quality. Since the out-of-pocket cost of a hospitalization to a
Medicare patient is independent of the hospital she or he chooses, it
seems likely that competitive pressures will make this elasticity quite
large, although such competitive forces will surely be limited bygeo-
graphic factors in areas where there are few hospitals so that patient
options are limited due to high search and transportation costs, and
where changes in quality are more likely to be coordinated (Bain 1951,
Stigler 1968, White 1972, Tirole 1988). Rearranging equation (3.4) and




Quality is set to a minimum for unprofitable patients, so equation
(3.6) applies where patients are profitable (thus, the numerator is posi-
tive), and quality for profitable patients rises with the degree of compe-
tition. As indicated above, quality falls with increasing severity, and
here the rate at which expenditures on quality fall with increasing se-
verity rises with increasing elasticity of demand with respect to quality
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(for example, competition), so that the positive effect of competition on
costs is dampened for more costly patients. Thus, an increasingly com-
petitive environment under prospective payment has the effect of rais-
ing quality most for the least costly patients. Because competition
under prospective payment may also increase efficiency, this may not
result in an absolute increase in costs but should at least lessen cost de-
creases for the least expensive patients relative tothe most costly pa-
tients, for whom the clear incentive is to reduce expenditures if
possible because they are not profitable. Indeed, in the limit, as the
elasticity of demand with respect to quality approaches infinity expen-
ditures on quality fall dollar for dollar with increasing severity of ill-
ness because all profits are competed away ateach level of severity.
IV.Data and Methods
Data Description: California Hospital Cost and Financial Data
We use the 1983 and 1993 hospital discharge and financialdata re-
leased for public use by the California Office of Statewide Health
Planning and Development (OSHPD). The financial data is described
in detail below. The discharge data cover all inpatient discharges from
every licensed, nonfederal hospital inCalifornia, as well as discharges
from some specialized facilities such as psychiatric hospitals and reha-
bilitation and nursing facilities. Data elements available for each pa-
tient abstract in the public-use files include facility identifiers, patient
age, zip code of patient residence, expected sourceof payment, total
charges incurred by patients during their hospitalization episode, and
patient DRG classification. Additional data for calculating per-capita
spending and utilization rates comes from the U.S. Bureau of the Cen-
sus Intercensal Population Estimates by Age,Sex, and Race (U.S. De-
partment of Commerce, Bureau of the Census 1993, 1998).
We limit our analysis to all California state residents (identifiedby
zip code) discharged from acute-care facffities for which data on total
hospital charges are available. Certain institutions, many of which are
managed-care facilities such as Kaiser hospitals, do not report total
charges on their discharge abstracts because they are exempt from
standard OSHPD accounting procedures. As a convention, patients
discharged from these hospitals have zero charges recorded in their
abstracts, although true costs of treatment were nonzero. Since total
hospital charges for these patients cannot be ascertained, they are ex-
cluded from our analyses.864 Meltzer and Chung
To calculate costs, we begin with charge data that we convert to 1993
constant dollars using the general Consumer Price Index and then to
costs using annual, institution-specific ratios of costs-to-charges
(RCCs). These RCCs are calculated using the OSHPD Financial Disclo-
sure Data, which report facility-level data on total operating expenses,
gross patient revenue, and other nonoperating revenue. Because other
nonoperating revenue consists of revenue from hospital enterprises
such as the outpatient pharmacy and gift shop, we follow the approach
recommended by the Office of Statewide Health Planning and Devel-
opment (1993) in calculating RCCs:
total operating expenses - other nonoperating revenue RCC . (3.7) gross patient revenue
RCCs are commonly used to estimate costs from charges, but
OSHPD data do not permit disaggregation of inpatient charges into its
component departments and services. Thus, institution-level RCCs
must be used, which is an important limitation because they cannot
reflect discrepancies between costs and charges that arise due to inter-
nal cross-subsidization across departments and services within a facil-
ity Nevertheless, facility-level RCCs can adjust for certain discrep-
ancies between costs and charges [for example, whether or nota facil-
ity treats a large proportion of charity cases (Finkler 1982)] and have
been found to perform somewhat better than charges as proxies for
costs (Newhouse, Cretin, and Witsberger 1989; Schwartz, Young, and
Siegrist 1995). While this suggests some justification for analyzing
RCC-adjusted charges rather than raw charges, the most compelling
reasons during the period we study is the growing Inflation of charge
rates to full-paying patients and the concomitant use of rebates for
managed care contracts. The upshot of this is that charge growth based
on charges may overstate real cost increases (Dranove, Shanley, and
White 1991) if managed care rebates are not taken into consideration.
The advantage of using RCCs in this case is that increase in grosspa-
tient charges that are offset by increases in rebates will result ina de-
crease in the RCC as calculated above. As a result, estimates of costs
based on patient-level charges and RCCs are not inflated inappropri-
ately by the use of rebates.
In addition to the effects of discrepancies between costs and charges
on aggregate charge growth, it is also important to consider the possi-
bility that such discrepancies could have effectson costs across the
spending distribution if they do not apply uniformly across it. Indeed,Effects of Competition Under Prospective Payment on Hospital Costs 65
it is possible that the discrepancy between costs and charges could vary
across the spending distribution. For example, if the markup on
low-cost services and departments exceeds the markup on high-cost
services and departments, then the actual distribution of costs across
patients wifi be more concentrated than suggested by the distribution
of charges. Although it is not clear that this is the case, it is possible that
such markups may change over time, for example, if competition is
particularly intense in high-cost services so that cost containment dif-
ferentially reduces charges in these areas. If so, it is possible that an
analysis of hospital charges may overstate costs at the bottom of the
distribution in later years and understate costs at the top of the cost
distribution.
Although this would lead to patterns in hospital costs similar to
those we find, we do not believe that internal cross-subsidization
drives our results because we study a period in which all payers were
tightening their reimbursement policies, thereby imposing a constraint
on the extent to which hospitals could shift costs to other payers and
departments. Indirect support for this comes from Dranove and White
(1998), who studied the responses of California hospitals to Medicaid
fee reductions between 1983 and 1992 and found significant reductions
in levels of services provided to all patients, and Medicaid patients in
particular, but no evidence of cost shifting. The ideal data to test this
would allow us to assess whether rebates were more likely for sicker
patients within a hospital, but the available data do not permit this
disaggregated analysis because rebates are not made on a patient-level
basis. As an alternative check, however, we examined whether hospi-
tals in the OSHPD data that care for sicker patients (as measured by ei-
ther greater average age, length of stay, or in-hospital mortality) were
likely to give greater rebates to payers as a percentage of net revenue.
Our results suggest no evidence of any significant relationship or
change in relationship over time between rebates and patient age or
length of stay, but they do suggest a positive relationship between re-
bates and mortality in the first six years we study and that this relation-
ship is eliminated by the end of the period. While this latter result
could suggest an artificial inflation of costs for the sickest patients ini-
tially that is later eliminated, the effect is not large. Thus, while there
are possible reasons to be concerned that changes in the relationship
between costs and charges across patients who differ in severity of ill-
ness could influence our results, we cannot find evidence of any
changes in such relationships.66 Meltzer and Chung
Limitations of Cost and Financial Data
Several data and analytic limitations should be recognized at the out-
set. First, the 1983-1993 period was one during which hospital account-
ing and reimbursement systems were in flux. Hospitals are instructed
by OSHPD to report the total charges incurred during a patient's hos-
pitalization according to the facility's full-established rates prior to any
prepayment deductions. At a minimum, hospitals are to include all
charges associated with daily hospital services, ancillary services, and
patient care services in calculations of total inpatient charges per dis-
charge. Physician fees are omitted. Due to the volume of discharges
processed, OSHPD does not conduct comprehensive accounting
checks; hence, the reliability of reported data on charges is unknown.
Nevertheless, the OSHPD charge data has been widely used by several
researchers, for example, Robinson and Phibbs 1989, Stafford 1990,
Langa 1992, Langa and Sussman 1993, Melnick and Zwanziger 1995,
and Dranove and White 1998.
Another issue is related to our lack of data concerning charges asso-
ciated with outpatient care and forms of postdischarge care. Since the
introduction of PPS and managed care, many have speculated that any
decline in hospital spending may be offset by growth in other sectors
such as ambulatory and long-term care. Since we are unable to account
for cost shifting across sites of delivery our finding that growth in hos-
pital charges fell among high-cost admissions does not imply that the
total cost of treatment among high-cost admissions also fell because
these patients may be heavy consumers of postdischarge health care re-
sources. However, we found no tendency for differential cost reduction
among high-cost admissions with increasing competition in diagnoses
with high or increasing levels of discharge to skilled nursing facilities.
Even if such a pattern were found, it could be interpreted as providing
insight into a mechanism by which quality discrimination was
accomplished.
A final point concerns the period over which we have data to ana-
lyze. The earliest data we have date back to 1983, the year in which
Medicare's DRG-based Prospective Payment System was implemented
and legislation authorizing selective contracting between Medi-Cal
and service providers took effect. Also, throughout the 1983-1993
period, HMOs and various other managed care organizations emerged
and proliferated. Because we do not have comparable data that
antedate these major changes and because important changes wereEffects of Competition Under Prospective Payment on Hospital Costs 67
happening in the reimbursement strategies for younger persons at the
same time, it is important to be cautious in drawing a causal connec-
tion between these specific policies and observed trends in charge
growth. On the other hand, because Medicare PPS, Medi-Cal, and man-
aged care all rely on different approaches to achieve cost containment,
we can, to interpret our empirical findings, borrow insights from the
theoretical models of provider responses to alternative reimbursement
systems described above.
Measures of Competition
A large body of literature attempts to identify the appropriate mea-
sures of markets and competition in health care. Key debates in this lit-
erature concern methods for defining health care markets (for example,
geopolitical boundaries, patient flow, or economic measures such as
cross-price elasticities), the appropriate level of analysis (for example,
facility level, medical service level, or patient level), and mathematical
measures for computing market concentration (for example, the
Hirschman-Herfindahl Index, spatial density of competitors, or en-
tropy).9 Although these approaches may differ in their theoretical ap-
peal, both in general and in individual applications, expediency has
often been the operative criterion by which methodology has been cho-
sen. By far, the most common approach has been to define markets on
the basis of geopolitical boundaries (counties, Metropolitan Statistical
Areas (MSAs), and/or Health Service Areas (HSAs) and to measure
concentration using the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI) for total
admissions at the county level.10 In the analyses reported here, we fol-
low the same approach. Several studies have examined the robustness
of the empirical findings in hospital markets compared to alternative
methods of market delineation and concentration measurement. Some
have found that results are not robust compared to methods of market
definition (see, for example, Dranove, Shanley, and Simon 1992; Sohn
1996; Kessler and McClellan 1999). Consequently, future plans for our
research include replicating our analyses using alternative measures of
competition.
Analytic Plan
To analyze the effects of competition across the distribution of health
care expenditures, we include measures of competition in quantile re-68 MeltzerandChung
gressions of cost for patients above and below age 65, and before the
implementation of PPS in 1983 and after, in 1993. Our basic hypothesis
is that competition under PPS will exert a downward pressure on costs
among the most expensive elderly patients in 1993 relative to its effects
among the less expensive elderly in 1993, relative to the expensive el-
derly in 1983, and relative to its effects among the young. To select the
most appropriate comparison group among the young, we focus on
persons age 55-64, though our results are not substantially different
when we include persons age 5-54. Since our theory does not specify a
specific measure of concentration, and since we have no reason to sus-
pect a linear relationship between any particular measure of concentra-
tion and costs, we define a set of indicator variables to categorize
counties in terms of their competitiveness based on the HHI ("less
competitive" HHI>0.20, "moderately competitive" 0.20HHI>
0.10, "competitive" 0.10HHI> 0.05, and "very competitive" HHI
0.05). We also control for payer (Medicare, Medi-Cal, other nonprivate,
and private), as well as various market-level and hospital characteris-
tics. The market-level characteristics are log physicians per capita, log
HMO enrollment rate, log county population, and log income per ca-
pita. Hospital-level characteristics in our model are ownership status
(for-profit versus nonprofit), teaching status (teaching hospital versus
nonteaching hospital), number of licensed beds, and total number of
discharges per year. In our basic specification, we do not control for pa-
tient characteristics such as age or comorbidity because PPS does not
base much, if any, of its reimbursement rate on those factors. As a re-
sult, selectively caring for patients who are younger or have fewer
comorbidities may be a mechanism by which hospitals respond to PPS
and limit costs. In other words, controlling for age and comorbidity
could mask the effect we aim to identify. In alternative specifications,
we also include patient age and the number of secondary diagnoses,
but find little change in our overall results.
We limit our analyses to the twelve largest DRGs by volume of dis-
charges, more specifically, those DRGs with at least 10,000 discharges
over the age of 4 in 1983 and 1994 combined. An important concern in
this analysis relates to the incentives under Medicare PPS for hospitals
to engage in "DRG creep," that is, the practice of progressively up-
coding patients into DRGs with a higher reimbursement rate for a
given condition (Carter, Newhouse, and Relles 1990). As a result of
DRG creep, changes in charges within each stratified DRG may reflect
trends in coding and classification rather than changes in service provi-Effects of Competition Under Prospective Payment on Hospital Costs 69
sion. To address this concern, we aggregated DRGs for the same proce-
dure and/or condition that are stratified for severity in calculating
utilization rates and growth in charges.11
Adjustments for Changes in Discharge Rates
To know how to interpret changes in the effects of competition at dif-
ferent points in the spending distribution over time, and to generate
meaningful estimates of cost growth over time at different points in the
spending distribution, it is important to consider the dramatic decline
in admission rates in California over this period because a given posi-
tion in the spending distribution may reflect a different degree of sever-
ity in different years. The California data show that per-capita hospital
discharge rates declined steadily from 112 discharges per 1,000 total
population in 1983 to 69 discharges per 1,000 total population by 1993.
The decline in California's discharge rates is consistent with national
utilization trends, which began slowing in the 1970s but declined even
further since the 1980s. Much of the decline has been attributed to more
widespread use of utilization control mechanisms by Medicare, state
Medicaid programs, managed care, and other third-party payers.
These controls include peer-review organizations, physician gatekeep-
ers, and precertification requirements employed by Medicare and other
third-party payers. In California especially, declining rates of dis-
charges may also reflect the expansion of HMO enrollment and the
shift of many services to outpatient settings.
Assuming stable population morbidity from year to year, a falling
admission rate implies that in each successive year, a smaller propor-
tion of episodes of illness result in hospitalization. If one were to rank
all admissions in order of increasing severity of illness, it would be rea-
sonable to assume that, given the nature of utilization control mea-
sures, the distribution would tend to be truncated from the left, leaving
the least severely ill patients denied hospital admission. Hence, not
only does the proportion of the population experiencing hospitaliza-
tion shrink over time, but the average severity level of the hospitalized
population would also be expected to increase because there are fewer
"healthy" admissions to dilute the spending distribution.
Figure 3.1 ifiustrates how shifts in utilization rates can complicate
intertemporal comparisons of expenditures at specific locations within
the population spending distribution. The x axis plots the percentage of
the population ranked in order of increasing severity of illness. The yH1
0 25 50 7580 100
I III
Percentage of population ranked by severity of illness
0 5060 100
Percentage of admissions ranked by severity of illness
Discharge distribution in year 0
0 25 50 7580
I III
Percentage of population ranked by severity of illness
0 3850
Inpatient
Percentage of admissions ranked by severity of illness
Discharge distribution in year 1
Figure 3.1
Intertemporal comparisons of percentile locations in the spending distribution, adjusting
for changes in hospital utilization rates
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100Effects of Competition Under Prospective Payment on Hospital Costs 71
axis plots the frequency or number of individuals at each severity level.
The curves in figure 3.1(a) and 3.1(b) depict the distribution of ifiness in
a given population, which we assume to be stable, at two time points:
year 0 and year 1. H0 and H1 represent the discharge rates in year 0 and
year 1, respectively. In this hypothetical population, the top 50 percent
of the population ranked in terms of morbidity were hospitalized in
year 0. In year 1, the admission rate fell to 40 percent.
Suppose we wish to compare the effects on median hospital charges
between year 0 and year 1. In year 0, the median discharge (M0) was the
patient at the 75th percentile of the disease distribution. In year 1, the
median discharge (M1) was at the 80th percentile of the disease distri-
bution. Because of the falling discharge rate between year 1 and
year 2, these two discharges are not directly comparable. This is seen in
figure 3.2 by the dotted line that traces M0 down to the disease distribu-
tion in year 1, and by the dotted line that traces M1 above to the disease
distribution in year 0. Thus, the median discharge in year 0 was less ill
than the median discharge in year 1. Without taking into account fall-
ing discharge rates, a simple comparison between the median hospital-
izations in year 0 and year 1 will compare patients that differ in their
severity of illness.
To address this concern due to faffing admission rates, we also per-
formed all our analyses based on adjusted percentiles in which we aim
to compare persons with comparable levels of severity of illness.
Therefore, we examine growth rates or the effects of competition at ad-
justed percentiles wherever discharge rates fell between two time




where Po is the adjusted percentile in year 0, P1 is the percentile in the
later time period (year 1), and H0 and H1 are the discharge rates in the
two corresponding years. For example, to compare costs at the median
of the spending distribution of the hypothetical population, we should
compare the median discharge in year 1 to the discharge at the 60th




We use this approach directly to calculate growth rates at different per-
centiles in the spending distribution. To analyze the effects of competi-(J) Kidney and udyary traot Infactico
RCC-adjusted charges in thousands of U.S. dollars
Figure 3.2 (a-i)
The distribution of RCC-adjusted charges in DRG in 1993: age 65+
d)) Nlddcnnatondmetybotndisordora 0) P000mco)a
ncc-odjosradcneaaelr lHOrolSUa ncc-cdgeladccaroa.io It000tSUB flOO.Micatedncaraaalrf.acenfecn
(a) Acute myocardial infarction (b)AegIna (c)Atrtrythnria
Cd) Cerabravaacclar accident (a) Chronic obetorcrlve pulmonary disease (Oneapheyoalendgearnoirreeliral eIanaliartouadiaordans
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tion, we implement this adjustment by performing our regression
analyses using the same number of observations drawn from the top of
the distribution of the 1983 data as we have in the 1993 data.
Our method of adjustment exploits the fact that discharges fell over
time and the fact that utilization control mechanisms typically raised
the threshold of illness severity for hospital admission. This raises sev-
eral potential problems. One is that in DRGs where discharge rates rise
over time, it is not clear whether expanded services were extended to
the less severely ill, or if improvements in technology and medical
management enabled treatment of a greater number of the severely
ill who would otherwise have remained untreated. Thus, in analyz-
ing spending growth for the few DRGs where admission rates rose, we
use all the observations from 1983 and analyze only unadjusted
percentiles.
Probably more important is the possibility that reductions in admis-
sion did not come uniformly from the left tail of the distribution during
this period. In an extreme example, suppose that, although we as-
sumed that the reduction of 43 admissions per 1,000 population be-
tween 1983 and 1993 came from the left of the distribution (the
"healthy" side), the reductions actually came entirely from the left side
of the distribution. This might happen, for example, if the 43 fewer ad-
missions in 1993 were terminally ill individuals who had been shifted
into hospices but who would have died in hospitals at high cost in
1983. The top of the 1993 distribution would then be expected to have a
lower average severity of illness level compared to the top of the 1983
distributionthe opposite of our assumption. This implies that an un-
adjusted comparison would understate growth, and that our adjust-
ment procedure would further exacerbate this. Fortunately, for the
diagnoses we examine, we believe that most of the reductions in
admissions are due to the movement of less severely ill patients to
the outpatient setting. This is supported by the observation that the
greatest declines in admission rates in our sample were among admis-
sions for esophageal and gastrointestinal disorders, which likely re-
sults from a movement toward treatment of the least severely ill
patients in an ambulatory setting. It is also supported by additional
analyses we performed showing that the degree of comorbidity of
patients in these DRGs increased over our sample period.12 Neverthe-
less, we also examined the robustness of our findings under the as-
sumption that the reduction in admissions is distributed evenly across74 Meltzer and Chung
the spending distribution by examining growth rates at the unadjusted
percentiles.
V.Results
Distribution of RCC-Adjusted Charges by DRG: 1983 and 1993
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show the number of cases and the distribution of
costs in 1983 and 1993 for the twelve DRGs we examine. As figure 3.2
shows clearly, the distribution of costs in every DRG is highly skewed
to the right, with about two-thirds of all admissions having costs below
the mean (tables 3.1 and 3.2). This lays out the basic incentives implicit
in PPS: that the majority of patients are profitable, while a minority are
unprofitable but potentially responsible for large losses.
Growth of RCC-Adjusted Charges by DRG: 1983 and 1993
Table 3.3 shows the growth of costs from 1983 to 1993 at unadjusted
and adjusted percenifies for persons older than age 65. Although there
are few exceptions, the vast majority of the unadjusted and adjusted
growth rates clearly show falling growth with increasing position in
the spending distribution, as predicted by the theoretical predictions of
the effects of prospective payment on costs.
Table 3.4 repeats these analyses for persons age 55-64. While the pat-
tern is not as strong in several diagnoses as for those persons age 65
and older, there is still a clear trend for falling growth with increasing
position in the spending distribution. This is not predicted by the theo-
retical model, and we will discuss possible reasons for this anomaly
later.
Effects of Competition on Hospital Expenditures: 1983 and 1993
For the sake of parsimony, we present the full results of quantile regres-
sion analyses examining the effects of competition on cost at selected
points in the distribution for one DRG onlyacute myocardial infarc-
tion (AMI). The rest of the results are summarized in a separate table.
Table 3.5 reports the quantile regression results for AMI admissions
among persons age 65 and older in 1983 and 1993. table 3.6 reports re-
sults of parallel analyses for persons in the 55-64 age group. Table 3.7




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Quantile regression parameter estimates: acute myocardial infarction, age 65+
b<005
Cp<O.Ol








Payer (omit: private and H1VIO)
Medicare 310 449 827b 2,237a 1,350
Medi-Cal 207 547a 1,239a 2,954a 2,683
Other nonprivate -165-197 509 804 1,634
Market level variables
Log physicians per capita 494C 867C 1,733c 3,064c 3,444a
Log HMO enrollment ratio -21 42 61 46 -278
Log population -78 -273' _323c_523b -672
Log income per capita 1,232c 1,568' 1,372' 893 621
Level of competition [omit lowid
Moderate 327a 612 1,123c 2,219a 2,879a
Competitive 418a 899c 1,034 2,807 4,226a
Very competitive 1,243 2,327c 3,775c 7,232' 11,730c
Hospital level variables
Investor-owned (omit: NFP and other) 374c_468c_566c-690 -797
Number of licensed beds 0 2' 2C 4a lic
Total number of discharges (1983) OC Oc oc
Teaching hospital (omit: nontech) 607c 839C 1,042' 1,809c 2,498c







Payer (omit: private and HMO)
Medicare 712c 1017c1517c 2384C 2977c
Medi-Cal 1,125c 1,857c2,726' 4,778c 9,405c
Other nonprivate -47 44 585 1,854 970
Market level variables
Log physicians per capita -358 575a_931a-954-1,947
Log HMO enrollment ratio 15 32 67 0 -14
Log population 356' 628' 1 037c 1 737C 2 892C
Log income per capita 3,180c 4,781' 6,969c 7,788 11,828C
Level of competition (omit low)d
Moderate 642' 1,048' 1,623'_1,903c 4,222'
Competitive _822c_1,382c_2,287c_3,729c_6,394c
Very competitive _1,454c-2,423'_3,544C_4,745c 8,338
Hospital level variables
Investor-owned (omit: NFP and other) 135 260a 693 l,7l8' 2,998'
Numberoflicensedbeds ic _2C _3C _4C _8a
Total number of discharges (1983) 0' 0 0' 0' 0'
Teaching hospital (omit: nontech) -28 255a 666C 1,222' 1,244b
Constant _34,452c _52,872c _79,199c _92,734c _149,329c
ap<OlOTable 3.6
Quantile regression parameter estimates: acute myocardial infarction, ages 55-64
25th 75th 90th 95th
1983 percentile Medianpercentile percentile percentile
cp<o.o1
d Low [1.00Herf> 0.20], moderate [0.20Herf> 0.10], competitive [0.10Herf> 0.05], very
competitive [0.05Herf]
Patient level variables
Payer (omit: private and WvIO)
Medicare 126 106 438b 1,820 2,665a
Medi-Cal 114 5Q9C 864c 2,956C 6,865C
Other nonprivate -106 -186 -65 326 990
Market level variables
Log physicians per capita 232 290 642" 553 1,581
Log HMO enrollment ratio 16 -54 -48" 42 -172
Log population -2 -74-119 -26 -64
Log income per capita 936' 1,804c 1,922c 2,158" 1,493
Level of competition [omit low]"
Moderate 269 441a1,240 1,625b 2,610b
Competitive 623 987< 1,461C 1,264 2,469
Very competitive 839 1,955c3,268 4,275c 7,826c
Hospital level variables
Investor-owned (omit: NW and other)-226" 429c 588'-658-1,782"
Number of licensed beds 0 1 3C 3 2
Total number of discharges (1983) OC OC oa 0 0"
Teaching hospital (omit: nontech) 263 646c 1,519C 2,708C 3,837c
Constant _9,022a _18,760c -17,396-18,392-3,923
25th 75th 90th 95th
1993 percentile Medianpercentile percentile percentile
Patient level variables
Payer (omit: private and HMO)
Medicare 331b 583 946c3,c 4,274C
Medi-Cal 443a 886C 1,728' 3,321c 6,131'
Other nonprivate 242 527 749 924 l,457'
Market level variables
Log physicians per capita -1,038'_1,289c-919-1,424-3,497"
Log liMO enrollment ratio -87 167b _271F'-177. -651
Log population 453C 325b 508 1 141 1 173
Log income per capita 4,069' 5,803' S,637C 7,231 11,508
Level of competition (omit low)"
Moderate _914c-903- 326- 271 1,001
Competitive _1,049c _989a_1,606a_2,724a 1,894
Very competitive _l,8llC-1,458_1,827a 3,M3a-1,814
Hospital level variables
Investor-owned (omit: NFP and other) 391' 817C 1,577c 3,489c 4,243C
Number of licensed beds -1 0 0 0 -4
Total number of discharges (1983) OC Oc 0 0a
Teaching hospital (omit: nontech) 148 385 547 1,295c 2,548C
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3Effects of Competition Under Prospective Payment on Hospital Costs 93
regressions for all twelve DRGs for 1983 and 1993, and for both age
groups. Beginning with the left panel of table 3.7, we find that in 1983,
in every case, costs rise with increasing competition, and particularly
for the most expensive admissions. This is consistent with the "medical
arms race" literature, which suggests that under the retrospective reim-
bursement system in place at the beginning of the period we study, a
more competitive hospital market will raise costs as hospitals compete
to attract doctors and their patients by offering added services (Robin-
son and Luft, 1985). In contrast, in 1993, increasing competitiveness is
associated with decreased costs in all twelve DRGs. This is consistent
with previous findings such as those of Melnick and Zwanziger (1988),
who found that costs fell by more than 11 percent for hospitals in the
most competitive markets in California during this period while actu-
ally rising in the least competitive markets. Not addressed in their
findings, however, is the strong pattern we observe for the reductions
in expenditures with increasing competition to increase progressively
along the spending distribution, as predicted by the incentive structure
of PPS to induce selective reduction of expenditures among the most
expensive patients. Among the elderly, for example, AMI admissions
at the 95th percentile are associated with an estimated $8,338 reduction
in hospital costs, compared to a reduction of $1,454 in costs at the 25th
percentile.
The columns of table 3.7 labeled age 55-64 repeats the above analy-
ses for the younger age group. In general, we still find strong positive
effects of competition on costs in 1983, but in 1993, we find much
smaller negative effects of competition on costs that are statistically
significant for only four of the twelve DRGs. Several DRGs also show a
statistically insignificant trend toward lower costs with competition.
This raises the question of whether some of the difference is due to re-
duced sample size. However, increasing the sample analyzed to in-
clude all persons below age 65, or adding additional years of data (for
example, 1992), did not meaningfully alter these results. This suggests
that whatever forces led to changes in the distribution of hospital ex-
penditures in these diagnoses among the elderly between 1983 and
1993 may have also affected patients younger than age 65, although the
effects do not appear to have been as powerful.
Adjustments for Changes in Discharge Rates
To address the concern that percentiles in one year may not be compa-
rable to percentiles in another year due to changes in severity of ill-94 Meltzer and Chung
ness, especially due to declines in admission rates asdescribed previ-
ously, we also examined quantile regressions for DRGs in which ad-
mission rates fell from 1983 to 1993, and thus limited the number of
observations in 1983 to the number in 1993, to compare "comparable
patients" assuming no change in the underlying distribution of dis-
ease. These results were not substantively different from the regres-
sions reported in tables 3.5 through 3.7.
VI. Summary and Conclusion
Using annual patient discharge data from all nonfederal, acute-care
hospitals in the state of California from 1983 and 1993, we examined
growth in hospital costs and the effects of competition on costs at vari-
ous points in the spending distribution for personsabove and below
age 65 in the twelve largest DRGs. Our analyses of costgrowth show
cost growth falling with increasing position in the spending distribu-
tion in every DRG we studied, as predicted by the effects of Medicare
PPS. However, a very similar pattern is also evident among admissions
of patients age 55-64. Our analyses of the effects of competition show a
strong trend for increasing competition to increase expenditures in all
age groups in 1983, with increasing effects at higher locationsin the
spending distribution. Our analyses for those older than age 65 in 1993
show the opposite pattern, however, with increasing competition asso-
ciated with decreased costs, and the effects far larger among the most
expensive patients. This pattern is not as pronounced among those
younger than age 65, suggesting that spending on persons olderthan
age 65 during this period may have been subject to someforces differ-
ent than those affecting spending on persons younger than age 65.
These findings are broadly consistent with the model of provider be-
havior under alternative reimbursement schemes that we present. This
predicts a tendency for hospitals to skimp on unprofitable patients and
to milk profitable patients under fixed-rate prospective reimburse-
ment. Although several studies have documented lower resource utili-
zation associated with fixed-rate reimbursement systems, fewer have
considered the possibility that such reductions might differentially af-
fect profitable and unprofitable classes of patients, and none have dem-
onstrated these patterns of increasing cost reductions among high-cost
patients for Medicare PPS or shown that these reductions rise with in-
creasing competition.
Certainly, the establishment of PPS and its associated incentives to
decrease costs among the most costly patients is a plausible explana-Effects of Competition Under Prospective Payment on Hospital Costs 95
tion for the patterns we observe among the elderly, but several other
possible explanations are worth considering. One explanation is that
there were changes in particular medical technologies or in the under-
lying severity of illness among the elderly over this period, and that
these changes somehow selectively reduced expenditures for the
high-cost elderly relative to the low-cost elderly. The fact that we see a
fairly similar pattern of growth among the young is somewhat sugges-
tive of this alternative account. It is not clear why this is the case, but it
is highly plausible that practice patterns are likely to be similar for
older and younger patients, so that incentives implicit in PPS end up
affecting practice patterns for patients below age 65 as well. If the
changes in spending we observe are explained by some specific change
in underlying severity of illness or medical technology, it is not clear
why such changes should occur over such a broad range of diagnoses
or why they should be associated with increased competition. Also, in
additional analyses, we stratified the elderly according to age and con-
trolled for measurable aspects of underlying comorbidity and found no
changes in our results.
Another possibility is that our results reflect changes in coding prac-
tices under Medicare, often referred to as "DRG creep." We have tried
to address this concern in our analysis by combining related DRGs
with and without complications, but it is possible that this does not
capture all the changes that could have occurred. Indeed, one particu-
lar concern is that the development of the tracheostomy DRG in 1991
for patients requiring mechanical ventilation may have drawn some
expensive patients out of the upper part of the distribution of costs
from some of our DRGs. While this is important to consider, the frac-
tion of all admissions coded into the tracheostomy DRG is only 0.1 per-
cent to 0.2 percent. This seems to explain the broad changes we see
across the spending distribution for such a broad range of diagnoses. In
addition, some of the pattern we identify is clearly present by 1991,
when the tracheostomy DRG was just being introduced. It is somewhat
surprising that such recoding would be present only in the most com-
petitive markets, though that would also certainly be of interest if it
were the case. It should also be noted that, to the extent that some of
our diagnoses may be more highly reimbursed than other closely re-
lated diagnoses, they may also be the recipients of upcoding, in which
case one would expect expenditures at the lower end of the distribu-
tion to decline as healthier patients are added to the distribution.
Finally, it should be noted that our finding that cost reductions are
greatest for the most expensive patients can also be interpreted as sim-96 Meltzer and Chung
piy reflecting the idea that it is easier to save large amounts of money
where more money is spent. We are sympathetic to this concern, but
note that we find a similar pattern of reductions in DRGs that are more
expensive as well as in DRGs that are less expensive. It is not always
the case that it is easier to decrease spending where more money is
spent. To ifiustrate, analysis of data from a natural experiment compar-
ing the cost of hospital care provided by doctors who specialize in in-
patient care to hospital care by doctors who spend only a small fraction
of their time taking care of inpatients reveals no evidence that cost sav-
ings differed across the distribution of costs (Meltzer et al. 2000).
With an understanding of the limitations of our analysis, it appears
that increasing competition in the context of prospective payment is as-
sociated with selective reductions of expenditures for the most expen-
sive patients. Whether this is desirable is impossible to determine
without an analysis of the effects on outcomes. Nevertheless, our re-
suits suggest several clear lines for such analysis.
First, the possibility that costs are selectively reduced for the most
costly patients suggests that outcomes may be selectively affected.
While more than a few studies have examined the effects of prospec-
tive payment on outcomes (for example, Rodgers et al. 1990 and ac-
companying articles, Cutler 1995), none has stratified outcomes
according to patient cost. Our results suggest that such analyses might
be very useful because it is possible that adverse effects among the
most costly patients might be masked by their inclusion with less
costly patients, whose outcomes may even improve if increased re-
sources allocated to attracting them to a particular hospital have some
positive (albeit small) effect on outcomes. The same conclusion applies
for attempts to measure the effects of competition on outcomes (see, for
example, Kessler and McClellan 1999).
Our results also have important implications for measuring the qual-
ity of care under prospective payment systems, and especially in com-
petitive environments, because they suggest that high-cost patients
may be at particular risk in such contexts. Thus, it is important that
quality measures reflect the concerns of that potentially vulnerable
group. Even when a single measure of quality is used, our findings
may have implications for how to measure quality of care. For exam-
ple, our findings may provide a justification to prefer outcomes mea-
sures to process measures because process measures can suggest that
quality is high over the whole population when the quality of care for
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outcomes are often favorable for less severely ill (less costly) patients in
any case, so expending greater resources on them is unlikely to im-
prove outcomes. It is worth noting that this basic conclusion remains,
regardless of whether one believes that cost reductions were largest
among the most costly patients due to selective incentives within a pro-
spective payment, or whether one simply believes that cost reductions
are largest for the most costly patients simply because, as the old adage
goes, "that's where the money is." A related issue is whether the effects
of competition on costs should be interpreted as reducing quality or,
rather, improving efficiency. Resolution of this question will be possi-
ble only with data that permits a comprehensive assessment of
outcomes.
It should be noted that the combination of prospective payment and
competition studied here is not unique to Medicare PPS, but in fact, is
the basic idea behind the increasing use of capitated managed-care ar-
rangements and competition to control costs, including Medicare man-
aged care. Indeed, such managed competition arrangements present
similar incentives to expend resources to attract less costly participants
while avoiding more costly ones. It is not difficult to imagine that these
incentives result in substantial investments in weliness programs and
preventive services, amenities that improve access for working per-
sons, reductions in copayments, etc., that would attract relatively
healthy participants. Even casual observation of the offerings of health
maintenance organizations leaves little question that many of these
benefits are indeed occurring, but whether such expenditures are an
efficient use of health care resources and how they may affect the care
received by the most severely ill are important questions for future
work. This is especially true given evidence that quality of care in
FIMOs may be the worst for patients who are chronically ill (Miller and
Luft 1997), and that HMOs may limit expenditures for severely ill per-
sons in intensive care (Rapoport et al. 1992, Cher and Lenert 1997).
Finally, it should be noted that various approaches can be tried to im-
prove upon existing prospective payment systems, for example, risk
adjustment and the use of blended payment schemes that include both
prospective and retrospective components designed to mitigate incen-
tives for patient selection or discrimination in care provision. Indeed,
the Medicare PPS has always tied reimbursement to the amount of care
provided to some extent, and thus never truly became fully prospec-
tive (McClellan 1997). Proposals have been seriously considered to
expand this retrospective aspect of Medicare PPS as well as to improve98 Meltzer and Chung
risk adjusters by developing a DRG system that allows a finer class-
ification of admissions (Newhouse, Buntin, and Chapman 1997). Our
work provides support for the value of further examination of both
approaches.
Notes
For standard textbook discussion, see Peter Zweifel and Friedrich Breyer (1997),
Health Economics, NY: Oxford Press, and Charles Phelps (1997), Health Economics Second
Ed., Reading, MA: Addison Wesley.
By annual volume of discharges within DRGs.
For a good summary of the cost-contaiiunent effort in California during the 1980s, see
Langa 1992.
A detailed overview on forms of managed care can be found in Gold et al. 1995.
In practice, this may be implemented by increasing spending on infrastructural ele-
ments that may be most important to health patients (such as a pleasant cafeteria or wait-
ing area), and decreasing spending on infrastructure that is most important to the sickest
patients (such as expensive imaging machines or intensity of ICU care). It might also be
implemented by reducing pressure on physicians to discharge relatively healthy patients
quickly.
The classic example of this is the free car seat sometimes offered to expectant parents
to induce them to deliver their child at a particular hospital.
Note, however, that the relationship between competition and quality in general may
be much more complex than this in settings where both price and quantity may be varied
because it will also depend on the complementarity between quantity and quality
(Spence 1975, Saving 1982). Another alternative view is reflected in Satterthwaite (1979),
in which an increasing number of sellers in a market effectively raises search costs by de-
creasing the value of information held by any individual about a particular seller.
Discharges from managed care facilities exempted from standard accounting require-
ments were identified in the data by a zero in the field for total charges, although actual
charges were nonzero. In total, this involves omitting 8.8 percent of discharges.
A large amount of literature defines hospital markets for the purpose of measuring
competition.Traditional measures have included market definitions based on
geopolitical boundaries such as counties or metropolitan statistical areas (for example,
Joskow 1980), distance (Robinson and Luff 1985), or patient flows (for example, Melnick
and Zwanziger 1988). These measures have all been criticized for varying reasons, in-
cluding the (ir)relevance of geopolitical boundaries or distance with respect to competi-
tion, and the endogeneity of patient flows. While some newer approaches (for example,
Kessler and McClellan 1999) have tried to address these concerns, such approaches are
substantially more difficult to implement, and their merits have not yet been demon-
strated. While a comparison of multiple measures of competition would be of value, we
defer it for future work.
See also Stigler (1968) and Cowling and Waterson (1976) for a theoretical rationale for
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Another possibility would be to analyze the effects of competition on cost growth
within ICD-9 codes (International Classification of Disease, 9th ed.). However, we elected
not to do this because the incentives created by Medicare PPS that may differentially af-
fect high- and low-cost patients refer to high- and low-cost patients within DRG groups
rather than within ICD-9 codes.
Specifically, we calculated the Charlson comorbidity index based on secondary diag-
noses for the index admission, and found that the distribution of scores shifted upward
in all our DRGs (Charison et al. 1987, Deyo and Romano 1993, Romano et al. 1993).
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